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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent headline read, "Blood on Your Handset: Is your Cellphone
Made with Conflict Minerals Mined in the Congo? The industry doesn't
want you to know."' The message the headline purported to convey is
reminiscent of a similar concern a few years back with trade in "blood
diamonds," or "clouded diamonds." 2 During that period, rebel movements
throughout the African continent used proceeds from such trade to finance
armed conflicts and undermine legitimate governments, with the major
trouble areas being the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola,
and Sierra Leone. This is an unfortunate illustration of "resource curses,"
a situation where in a poor country natural resource abundance creates the
problem of poor governance, corruption, and nepotism.
As a result of growing awareness of this grave problem and public
pressures, attempts to find a solution led eventually to the Kimberley
*
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Ciara Torres-Spellisci, Blood on Your Handset: Is Your Cellphone Made with Conflict
Minerals Mined in the Congo? The Industry Doesn't Want You to Know, SLATE.COM (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and__plitics/jurisprudence/2013/09/conflict-minerals-from-the_congo
isyourcellphone made with them.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
2.
See Shannon K. Murphy, Clouded Diamonds: Without Binding Arbitration and More
Sophisticated Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, the Kimberley Process will Ultimately Fail in Ending
Conflicts FueledBy Blood Diamonds, II PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 207, 221-22 (2011).
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Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), adopted by thirty-nine diamondtrading countries in 2002' with implementation beginning in 2003.6 Under
the process, "conflict diamonds" are identified and excluded from the
legitimate trade.' However, because of the voluntary nature of the KPCSwith self-policing, inadequate monitoring, consensus decision-making, no
administrative structure, and no independent oversight-the results have
been mixed and the KPCS has faced severe criticism.8
For some time now, trade in "conflict minerals," which are mined in
the DRC and adjoining countries in the Great Lakes region of Africa, have
also been fueling armed conflicts in the region. Consumer demand for cell
phones, laptops, appliances, and jewelry fuels this trade and triggers the
conflicts. Several civil society groups have been actively seeking effective
means to end trade in conflict minerals originating in this region as
proceeds from such trade are one of the key elements responsible for the
ongoing conflicts.9
In response, the U.S. Congress in July 2010, included conflict minerals
provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act.' 0 In May of 2010, the U.S. State Department stated in a press release:
Minerals like tungsten, tin, tantalum and gold are used in a range
of industries, including electronics, jewelry and automotive.
Armed groups and military units in eastern DRC have used debt,
coercion and physical violence to force villagers to extract these
minerals from local mines. Proceeds from the illicit sale and

5.
Julie L. Fishman, Is DiamondSmuggling Forever? The Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme: The FirstStep Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade Problem, 13 U.
MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 218, 224-25 (2005).

6.

Id.

7.
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, KIMBERLEYPROCESS.COM, available at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/systeni/files/documentsKPCS%2OCore%20Document.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2014).
8.
See Murphy, supranote 2, at 221; see also Julie E. Nichols, A Conflict ofDiamonds: The
Kimberley Process and Zimbabwe's Marange DiamondFields, 40 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 648, 650
(2012), and Ian Smillie, Symposium, Blood Diamonds and Non-State Actors, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1003, 1014 (2013).
9.
Breaking the Links Between Natural Resources and Conflict: The Case for EU
Regulation, GLOBALWrrNESS.ORG (Sept. 2013), http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/
BreakingtheLinksENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Breaking the Links]; THE ENOUGH
PROJECT TEAM AND GRASSROOTs RECONCILIATION

GROUP, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO

CONGO'S CONFLICT MINERALS 1 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/
Comprehensive-Approach.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014); Conflict Minerals, ENOUGHPROJECT.ORG,
http://enoughproject.org/conflict-minerals (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
10.

15 U.S.C.

§78m(p)(5)
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trade of these metals are used to perpetuate the cycle of conflict,
human trafficking physical and sexual violence and human rights
abuses."
After President Obama signed the Act into law, then-Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton commented that:
[The] measure . . . will require corporations to publicly disclose

what they are doing to ensure that their products don't contain
these minerals. The DRC has formally expressed its support for
this law and has thanked both the executive and legislative
branches of our government. This is one of several steps we are
taking to stop this illicit and deadly trade.12
Subsequently, the European Commission has been exploring the form
of its action on the conflict minerals issue. 3 In September 2013, European
Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht said that through "a successful . . .
initiative on responsible sourcing," the European Union (EU) would seek
first to "[h]elp keep money out of the hands of rebel groups," and second,
"[h]elp ensure that revenues from natural resources instead go to the
government, strengthening the rule of law and improving the provision of
vital services like health and education."' 4
This paper primarily focuses on the United States effort, which
includes the Dodd-Frank Act and the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) rule promulgated pursuant to the Act that imposes
certain disclosure requirements for companies that use conflict minerals
originating in DRC and the adjoining countries.
Part II discusses the
i1.
Industry Representatives Discuss Conflict Minerals at the U.S. Department ofState, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE (May 14, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/141880.htm (last visited
Feb. 20, 2014).
U.S. Sec'y of State Hillary Clinton, US. Financial Bill Will Require Disclosure on
12.
Conflict Minerals, CONGOPLANET.COM (July 22, 2010), http://www.congoplanet.com/news/1695/usfinancial-bill-disclosure-conflict-minerals-hillary-clinton-barack-obama-gomajsp (last visited Feb. 20,
2014).
13.
Katherine Llewellyn & Dynda A. Thomas, European Union Trade CommissionerHints at
Broad Approach of EU Conflict Minerals Strategy, LEXOLOGY.COM (Sept. 6, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-dlde7611-18a7-46aa-b48e-a75820d7094c
(last visited
Feb. 20, 2014).
14.
Karel De Gucht, European Trade Commissioner, Address at the Hearing of the
Development Committee of the European Parliament/Brussels: Conflict Minerals: The Role of Trade
(Sept. 17, 2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc_151848.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2014).
15.
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
240 and 249b); David J. Levine & Raymond Paretzky, SEC Proposes "Conflict Minerals" Disclosure
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pertinent provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and Part III discusses the Final
Rule. Part IV studies the subsequent developments, including the legal
challenge to parts of the Rule by the National Association of
Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Business Roundtable,
who claim those provisions to be "arbitrary and capricious" under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).16 They also mounted a constitutional
challenge to both the Dodd-Frank Act Section 1502 and the Rule on First
Amendment grounds.17 The concluding section, Part V, provides an
appraisal.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPANIES UNDER SECTION 1502
Amending Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act")," Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act increases
mandatory disclosure requirements relating to conflict minerals originating
from the DRC.19 Senator Dick Durbin stated during the debate on the Act
that the new disclosure scheme was "a reasonable step to shed some light
on this literally life-and-death issue," and that it would "encourage
companies using these minerals to source them responsibly." 20 Congress
expressed its belief that "the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals
originating in the [DRC] . . . is helping to finance conflict characterized by

extreme levels of violence in the eastern [DRC], particularly sexual and
gender-based violence, and [is] contributing to an emergency humanitarian
situation . . . .,,21 The statute requires the SEC to adopt regulations
mandating companies that use conflict minerals, which are "necessary to

Rules to Implement Dodd-Frank Provisions, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://www.mwe.com/SEC-Proposes-Conflict-Minerals-Disclosure-Rules-to-Implement-Dodd-FrankProvisions-01-13-2011/?PublicationTypes-d9093adb-e95d-4fl9-819a-f~bb517Oab6d (last visited Feb.
20, 2014).
16.
Delcy P. Sweet, United States: SEC Conflict Mineral Rule Upheld By The Federal
District Court, MONDAQ.COM
(Aug.
5, 2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/
256164/Securities/SEC+Conflict+Minerals+Rule+Upheld+by+the+Federal+District+Court (last visited
Feb. 20,2014).
17.

Id.

18.

15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012).

19.

Id.

20.
Dick Durbin, Restoring American FinancialStability Act of 2010, VOTESMART.ORG (May
17, 2010), http://votesmart.org/public-statement/508952/restoring-american-finacial-stability-act-of2010#.UuIAosKAOZx (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
21.
Melvin Ayogu & Zenia Lewis, Opinion, Conflict Minerals: An Assessment of the DoddFrank Act, BROOKINGS.EDU (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/10/03conflict-minerals-ayogu (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
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the functionality or production of a product," 22 to disclose to the
Commission whether those minerals originated in the DRC or an adjoining
country2 3 such as: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of
the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.24
Both the Dodd-Frank Act and the Final Rule define conflict minerals
as "columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their
derivatives," along with any other mineral or derivative that the Secretary
of State determines is "financing conflict" in the DRC. 25 "The derivatives
most commonly extracted from these conflict minerals are tantalum, tin,
gold and tungsten." 2 6 If such conflict minerals did originate in the DRC or
an adjoining country, then companies must also submit an additional report
to the Commission containing a "description of the measures taken .

.

. to

exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of such
minerals," and "a description of the products manufactured or contracted to
be manufactured that are not DRC conflict free."27
The statute defines "DRC conflict free" as a product that "does not
contain conflict minerals that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed
groups in the [DRC] or an adjoining country." 2 8 The report must also
describe "the facilities used to process the conflict minerals, the country of
origin of the conflict minerals, and [the] efforts to determine the mine or
location of origin with the greatest possible specificity." 2 9 An additional
requirement of the statute is that the company making any disclosure or
reports to the SEC under these provisions must make such disclosures or
reports publicly available on the company's own website.30
In Section 1502, the statute "also created responsibilities for other
federal agencies."3 ' To illustrate, the Comptroller General is required to
submit regular reports to Congress assessing "the rate of sexual and genderbased violence in war-torn areas in the DRC and adjoining countries."32
§ 78m(p)(2)(B)

22.

15 U.S.C.

23.

Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A).

24.

Id.

25.

H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.

(2012).

§ 1502(c)(4) (2010).

26.
The
Conflicts Minerals Rule,
AM.
COATINGS
ASS'N
(Sept.
2013),
http://www.paint.org/component/docman/catview/53-backgrounder.html?start-10 (last visited Feb. 20,
2014).

§78m(p)(1)(A)(i)-(ii)

27.

15 U.S.C.

28.

Id.

29.

Id. §78m(p)(1)(A)(ii).

30.

Id. §78m(p)(1)(E).

31.

Nat'1 Ass'n ofMfrs. v. S.E.C., 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

32.

H.R. 4173, 111 th Cong. § 1502(d)(1) (2010).

(2012).

§ 78m(p)(1)(D).
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The Secretary of State is also required to "submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a strategy to assess the linkages between human
rights abuses, armed groups, mining of conflict minerals, and commercial
The statute also requires the Secretary to produce and make
products."
publicly available "a map of mineral-rich zones, trade routes, and areas
under the control of armed groups in the [DRC] and adjoining countries."34
III. REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE SEC RULE
Companies are required to follow three overall steps to comply with
Step one requires the company to
the Section 1502 requirements.
determine whether it is covered by the Rule's requirements.3 s The Rule
applies to issuers that "file reports with the Commission under Section
13(a) or Section 15(c) of the Exchange Act,"36 and for which conflict
minerals are necessary to the functionality or production of a product
manufactured or contracted by that issuer to be manufactured.3 7 The Final
Rule clarifies that for a company to be considered as "contracting to
manufacture" a product, it should have some actual influence over the
manufacturing of that product.3 8
The SEC gave examples as to when an issuer would not be viewed as
"contracting to manufacture a product":
[I]f the company's actions involve no more than ... [s]pecifying
or negotiating contractual terms . . . that do not directly relate to

the manufacturing of the product, such as training or technical
support, price, insurance, indemnity, intellectual property rights,
dispute resolution, or other like terms . . . ; [a]ffixing its brand,

marks, logo, or label to a generic product manufactured by a third
party; . . . [s]ervicing, maintaining, or repairing a product

manufactured by a third party. 39
The Commission clarified the reason for this approach is that it avoids
sweeping a pure retailer into the Rule's scope because companies that
simply offer a "generic product under [its] own name or a separate brand

33.

Id. § 1502(c)(1).

34.

Id. § 1502(c)(2)(A)(i).

35.

See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,274.

36.

Id. at 56,287.

37.

Id. at 56,279.

38.

Id. at 56,291.

39.

Id.
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name" generally do not exert a sufficient degree of influence over the
manufacturing process. 40
Also, despite many comments asking the Commission to adopt a de
minimis exception to the Rule's coverage, the Commission declined to
adopt any type of categorical exception. 4 1 The SEC concluded that a de
minimis exception would be contrary to the Rule's purpose because the
standard "focuses on whether the conflict mineral is 'necessary' to a
product's functionality or production," rather than "the amount of a conflict
mineral contained in the product.A 2 It should be noted that the
Commission did not define when a conflict mineral is "necessary" to the
functionality or production of a product in the proposed rule.
Issuers subject to the conflict minerals rule must then conduct a
"reasonable country of origin inquiry. "4 The inquiry has to be "reasonably
designed to determine whether any of its conflict minerals originated in the
Covered Countries or are from recycled or scrap sources, and perform[ed]
in good faith."" The Commission explained that it would "view an issuer
as satisfying the reasonable country of origin inquiry standard if it seeks
and obtains reasonably reliable representations

.

. .

directly from that

facility or indirectly through the issuer's immediate suppliers . ...
Thus, the issuer must "[indicate] the facility at which its conflict
minerals were processed and demonstrat[e] that those conflict minerals did
not originate in the Covered Countries or c[o]me from recycled or scrap
sources."46 As to the reasonable country of origin inquiry, the Commission
clarified that such inquiry "is consistent with the supplier engagement
approach in the [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development] OECD Guidance where issuers use a range of tools and
methods to engage with their suppliers. The results of the inquiry may or
may not trigger due diligence."47 The OECD Due Diligence Guidancefor
Reasonable Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and HighRisk AreaS48 will be discussed later. The Commission expects issuers to be
40.

See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,290.

41.

See id. at 56,295.

42.

Id. at 56,298.

43.

Id. at 56,299.

44.

Id. at 56,280.

45.

See Conflict Minerals, 77 Red. Reg. at 56,312.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD DUE
DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR REASONABLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-AFFECTED

AND HIGH-RISK AREAS 1 (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf
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aware of the "warning signs" and "red flags," which may suggest that their
minerals originated in the Covered Countries, or otherwise cast doubt on
the source of their minerals. 4 9 Through such an inquiry, if an issuer:
[K]nows that its conflict minerals did not originate in the
Covered Countries or knows that they came from recycled or
scrap sources, or the issuer has no reason to believe its conflict
minerals may have originated in the Covered Countries, or the
issuer reasonably believes its conflict minerals came from
recycled or scrap sources, then in all such cases the issuer must
disclose its determination and describe briefly in the body Form
SD, the reasonable country of origin inquiry it undertook and the
results of the inquiry.50
On the other hand, if a company knows or has reason to believe that
the minerals "may have originated in the Covered Countries and may not
have come from recycled or scrap sources" then the issuer must proceed to
the third step of the Rule."
It is then that the issuer must perform "due diligence" on the source
and supply chain of its minerals and deliver a Conflict Minerals Report
(CMR). 52 The issuer is required "to use a nationally or internationally
recognized due diligence framework, if such a framework is available for
the specific conflict mineral."" According to the Commission, the OECD
Due Diligence Guidance satisfies its criteria and "may be used as a
framework for purposes of satisfying the final rule's requirement that an
issuer exercise due diligence in determining the source and chain of custody
of its conflict minerals."5 4 Also, as a "critical component of due diligence,"
an independent, "private sector audit is required."55 The audit is designed
to ensure that the issuer's due diligence "is in conformity with . . . [a]

nationally or internationally recognized due diligence framework" and that
the issuer's actual due diligence efforts comport with the due diligence
approach, as described in its report.56
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014) [hereinafter OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE] (addressing supply chain
management for "tin, tantalum, tungsten, their ores, and mineral derivatives, and gold").
49.

Conflict Minerals, 77 Red. Reg. at 56,313.

50.

Id. at 56,359.

51.

Id. at 56,281.

52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

See Conflict Minerals, 77 Red. Reg. at 56,326.

55.

Id. at 56,320.

56.

Id. at 56,328.
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If the issuer's due diligence shows that its minerals did originate in the
Covered Countries and did not come from recycled or scrap sources, or if
the issuer is unable to determine the source of its conflict minerals through
due diligence, the issuer must prepare and submit a CMR to the SEC.
However, following due diligence, if an "issuer determines that its conflict
minerals did not originate in the Covered Countries or came from recycled
or scrap sources, the issuer is not required to submit a [CMR]" but the
issuer must still prepare and submit a Form SD to the Commission
describing the scope and results of its due diligence efforts.
The CMR must include a description of the issuer's products that
"have not been found to be 'DRC conflict free,"' 59 and must include "a
description of the measures the issuer has taken to exercise due diligence on
the source and chain of custody of' its conflict minerals, which must be
accompanied by "a certified independent private sector audit."60 Also, if
the company's products cannot be identified as "DRC conflict free," the
Report must provide "a description of the facilities used to process those
conflict minerals, the country of origin of those conflict minerals, and the
efforts to determine the mine or location of origin with the greatest possible
specificity."6
The Commission also authorized a temporary transition
period of two years for those companies unable to determine the origin of
their conflict minerals, which are to be described as those minerals as
"DRC conflict undeterminable," rather than as having not been found to be
'DRC' conflict free. 62 Smaller companies are given a temporary transition
period of four years.
Companies are not required to place any type of label or disclosure on
products, although a copy of the CMR must be publicly posted on the
company's website.6 The Final Rule became effective on November 13,
2012, and the first reports and disclosures are due to be filed with the
Commission by May 31, 2014.5 OECD's Due Diligence Guidance
provides guidelines for companies that build on the general due diligence
principle and supply chains provisions contained in the OECD Guidelines

57.

See id. at 56,345.

58.

Id. at 56,315.

59.

See Conflict Minerals, 77 Red. Reg. at 56,360.

60.

Id. at 56,320.

61.

Id.

62.

Id. at 56,322.

63.

Id. at 56,323.

64.

See Conflict Minerals, 77 Red. Reg. at 56,333.

65.

See id.
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for Multinational Enterprises.66 As a multi-stakeholder initiative, the Due
Diligence Guidance, which involved the OECD, the United Nations,
governments of the Great Lakes region of Africa, the business community,
and civil society representatives, provides recommendations to companies
operating in or sourcing minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas
that is designed to help them avoid contributing to the conflicts fueled by
natural resources. 67
Due diligence processes for supply chains of minerals must be
consistent with relevant international standards and applicable law. 8 Under
the Due Diligence Guidance,the "nature and extent of due diligence that is
appropriate will depend on individual circumstances and be affected by
factors such as the size of the enterprise, the location of the activities, the
situation in a particular country, [and] the sector and nature of the products
or services involved."6 9 The Due Diligence Guidance consists of a fivestep framework for risk-based due diligence in supply chains of minerals
from conflict affected and high-risk areas:
1)
2)
3)

Establish strong company management systems;
Identify and assess risk in the supply chain;
Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified
risks;

4)
5)

Carry out independent third-party audit of supply chain due
diligence at identified points in the supply chain; and
Report on supply chain due diligence.70

The Due Diligence Guidance recommends a model mineral supply
chain policy, which provides a common set of clear expectations on
responsible sourcing and risk management strategies in order to respond to
identified risks that contribute to conflict or serious human rights abuses by
sourcing practices.7 It suggests measures for risk mitigation and indicators
for measuring improvement.7 2 It also provides a separate supplement on
tin, tantalum, and tungsten.
66.
Lahra Liberti, OECD 50th Anniversary: The Updated OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational
Enterprises and the New OECD Recommendation on Due Diligence Guidance for Conflict-Free
Minerals Supply Chains, 13 Bus. L. INT'L 35, 35-36 (2012).
67.

OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE, supranote 48, at 3, 9.

68.

See id. at 66-68.

69.

Id. at 15.

70.

Id. at 17-19.

71.

Id. at 20.

72.

OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE, supra note 48, at 25.

73.

Id. at 31-34.
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IV. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Legal Challenge

In Nat'1 Ass'n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C. ,74 the National Association of
Manufacturers, joined by the Chamber of Commerce and the Business
Roundtable, challenged several aspects of the SEC's Final Rule, claiming
that the Commission had ignored its obligations under the Exchange Act in
issuing the Rule and that the Commission's rule-making was arbitrary and
capricious under the APA. 75 They also challenged the Final Rule, as well
as Dodd-Frank, Section 1502 on constitutional grounds, arguing that the
publication of disclosures on the companies' websites, required by both the
SEC and Congress, compel speech in violation of the First Amendment. 6
The District Court rejected both these challenges, upholding the Final Rule
implementing Section 1502.n
The Court conducted a detailed and thorough analysis, separately
addressing the plaintiffs' two claims. Rejecting the challenge to the SEC's
cost-benefits analysis, the Court commented on the benefits aspects:
[U]pon review of the record, the Court is convinced that the
Commission appropriately considered the various factors that
Sections 3(f) and 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act actually require.
No statutory directive obligated the Commission to reevaluate
and independently confirm that the Final Rule would actually
achieve the humanitarian benefits Congress intended. Rather, the
SEC appropriately deferred to Congress's determination on this
point, and its conclusion was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary
to law ....

78

On the SEC's cost analysis, the Court said that "the Commission
weighed comments received from the various parties and exercised its
discretion in concluding which figures were most appropriate ... the Court
cannot say that the SEC acted arbitrarily or capriciously in reaching this
particular estimate." 9 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
Final Rule should have included a de minimis clause exempting companies
using small amounts of conflict minerals from reporting under the law,
74.

See Nat'1Ass'n ofMfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 46.

75.

Id. at 54.

76.

Id

77.

Id

78.

Id at 59.

79.

Nat'lAss'n ofMfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
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stating that given the SEC's "broader conclusion" that conflict minerals are
often used in minute amounts, the SEC believed that any type of categorical
de minimis exception had the potential to swallow the rule and would be
inappropriate; this analysis was sufficient to satisfy the Commission's
Thus, the Court concluded, "the
obligations under the APA.so
a de minimis exception in the Final
include
not
to
choice
Commission's
Rule was the product of reasoned decision-making, and the Court finds no
basis under the APA to subjugate the Commission's prerogative on this
8
point." '
Rejecting the plaintiffs' challenge to the Final Rule's "reasonable
country of origin inquiry," the Court concluded the SEC's adoption of this
rule "is based on a reasonable and permissible construction of Section 1502,
and is not otherwise arbitrary or capricious in contravention of the APA."82
The Court also upheld the Commission's extension of the Final Rule to
companies that "contract to manufacture" products with necessary conflict
minerals, rather than applying it to only those issuers or companies that
themselves manufacture such products, as it found the SEC's decision to be
"a perfectly permissible construction of Section 1502."8 Similarly, the
Court upheld the Commission's adoption of a different phase-in period of
four years for small companies, declining "to substitute its judgment on this
question for the Commission's."8 4
Finally, on the plaintiffs' separate constitutional challenge that the
disclosure requirements under the Final Rule and Dodd-Frank Section,
Section 1502 "improperly compel 'burdensome and stigmatizing speech' in
violation of the First Amendment," the Court found that the disclosure
scheme "directly and materially" advanced Congress's interest in
promoting peace and security in the DRC and the adjoining countries, and
rejected the challenge. The plaintiffs appealed the Court's decision, and
oral arguments were scheduled for January 7, 2014. A dozen current and
former members of Congress are among those who submitted an amicus
brief in support of the decision. Acknowledging that the implementation
80.

Id. at 62.

81.

Id. at 66.

82.

Id. at 70.

83.

Id. at 72.

84.

Nat 7 Ass n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 73.

85.

Id.

Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 1, Nat'1 Ass'n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.C.
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of the requirements is difficult, Representative Eliot Engel (D-NY) said in a
statement, "[b]ut we felt and continue to feel that these challenges are worth
it to protect the human and labor rights of very vulnerable individuals in
remote areas of the world, particularly the [DRC]."88 Representative Jim
McDermott (D-WA) added, "[h]opefully, it will also create transparency
that consumers and investors deserve.
B.

Other Developments

Non-government organizations (NGO) have remained active in
lobbying for effective action to end trade in conflict minerals. To illustrate,
as mentioned above, several NGOs called on the European Commission to
adopt legislation, which would mandate European companies to undertake
due diligence so that those in their supply chain do not engage in
production and trade in such minerals. 90 Such a legislative framework
would "clarify the responsibilities of European companies and . . . provide

the basis for appropriate oversight by regulators, markets and consumers."91
The NGOs called for the legislation to be binding, to apply to all segments
of the supply chain, and to have a global geographic scope and a broad
material scope applicable to all natural resources.92
Another initiative contrasts Dodd-Frank, Section 1502 with the Due
Diligence Guidance, as the former is seen to have "the unfortunate
unintended consequence of reducing formal trade in minerals, so depriving
tens of thousands of artisanal miners of their livelihood," due to the Due
Diligence Guidance "place[ing] the focus on responsible processes . . .
support[ing] a responsible minerals trade in conflict-affected areas, [and]
helping to improve economic and social conditions."93
It suggests that the EU should undertake the following three linked
initiatives:
1)

The EU should "encourage all companies to publicly
disclose their conflict-sensitive production or sourcing

88.
Lawmakers Join Fight Over Conflict Minerals Regulation, THEHILL.COM (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/court-battles/1 88923-lawmakers-join-fight-over-conflict-mineralsregulation (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
89.

Id.

90.

Breakingthe Links, supra note 9.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.
Addressing Human Rights Abuses From Gold Mining Without Stigmatisation,
EURACTIV.COM (June 13, 2013), http://www.euractiv.com/print/trade/gold-council-eu-needs-businessh-analysis-52851 1 (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
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practices," regarding all minerals, countries, and supply
chains, without mandating their use of a specific
instrument;94
The EU should give consideration to creating a publicprivate alliance aimed at actively supporting and
encouraging a responsible minerals trade; 95 and
The EU's development aid should support appropriate
"formalization programmes" in order to reduce the risk of
fueling unlawful armed conflict arising from illegal
mining.96 This initiative would promote responsible
sourcing and address the development needs of resourcerich countries.97

Another report, Coming Clean: A Proposalfor Getting Conflict
Minerals Back on Track,9 8 used field research to reveal that governments in
the Great Lakes Region, including the Congo and Rwanda, have not yet
fulfilled their commitments to the mineral certification process designed by
the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to ensure
accountability and transparency, which is undermining the credibility of the
system.99 The ICGLR's framework is called the ICGLR Regional Initiative
against the Exploitation of Natural Resources, and its mineral certification
scheme, called the Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM), is a main part
of the initiative.'o The RCM has four components:
1)
2)
3)
4)

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

Mine inspection and traceability;
A regional mineral tracking database;
Audits which are overseen by the ICGLR Audit Committee,
a committee of electronics companies, regional
governments, and NGOs which is not yet finalized; and
Independent monitoring, by the Mineral Chain Auditor
which has not yet been brought together.' 0'

98.
Aaron Hall & Sasha Lezhnev, Coming Clean: A Proposalfor Getting Conflict Minerals
Certification on Track, ENOUGHPROJECT.ORG (Nov. 2013), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/
ComingClean-Getting-Conflict-Minerals-Certification-on-Track.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013)
99.

Id.

100.

Id.

101.

Id.
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The report warned that without the full application of this process,
these countries risk disengagement from multinational companies, which
might halt consumption from those mines that are not certified as conflict
free. The report made recommendations to the United States, the EU, and
other governments, as well as donors, to provide necessary help so that
these governments implement the certification process. 0 2 Aaron Hall, coauthor of the report, stated:
Certification is the most critical component of the entire conflictfree minerals system. If minerals from the Great Lakes region
cannot be certified as conflict-free, then efforts to trace and audit
become moot. Without functioning regional audits or an
independent Mineral Chain Auditor, minerals cannot be credibly
certified according to regional and international standards. 0 3
Dodd-Frank, Section 1502 has indeed been a catalyst to international
efforts addressing conflict minerals issues. In addition to the EU, Canada
has been exploring certification schemes to prevent the sale of conflict
minerals to their companies.'0
On March 27, 2013, the European
Commission launched a public consultation on conflict minerals to get
views on "a potential EU initiative for responsible sourcing of minerals
coming from conflict zones and high-risk areas."' 05 The focus of such an
initiative in Europe is on being "reasonable and effective," and it is aimed
at complementing and continuing "ongoing due diligence initiatives and
support for good governance in mineral mining, especially in developing
countries affected by conflict."l 06
The EU is considering replicating its own initiative after Dodd-Frank
and is also looking for guidance to the OECD.10 7 European Trade
102.

Id.

103.
Carine Umuhumuza, Conflict Minerals: Companies May Stop Buying Unless
Certification is Sped Up, ENOUGHPROJECT.ORG (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.enoughproject.org/
node/6918 (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
104.
Zachary Hawley, Reducing Violence Associatedwith Conflict Minerals, GLICA.ORG (Feb.
1, 2014), http://www.glica.org/topics/show/93 (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
105.
EU Calls For Input On Conflict Minerals, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Mar. 27, 2013),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfn?id=882 (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
106.
Id. (The EU received 280 replies, of which 80% of businesses indicated an interest in
responsible sourcing); see Karel De Gucht, European Trade Commissioner, Address at the BDI Event:
Responsible Sourcing of Minerals from Conflict-Affected Regions/Brussels: Conflict Minerals: The
Need to Act (Sept. 3, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-13-673_en.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
107.
Kristen Wallerstedt, EU and Canada Consider Conflict Minerals Rules, 3ECoMPANY
(Apr. 4, 2013), http://3ecompany.com/blog/?p=172 (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).

300

ILSA JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 20:2

Commissioner De Gucht has indicated that the EU's initiative will have a
broader coverage than Dodd-Frank, as he stated, "[c]onflict minerals is not
a problem exclusive to the Great Lakes Region," because the guerillas in
Colombia and Venezuela have reportedly been using production of both
gold and the tantalum ore, coltan, to continue their campaign since the
production of cocaine has become more difficult."' 08 He also preferred the
European focus on "providing smelters-the narrowest point in the supply
chain-with incentives to carry out due diligence on their upstream
suppliers."l09 A consensus seemed to be emerging that after conducting an
impact assessment of the potential EU Directive, the OECD Due Diligence
Guidance should be used "as a reference in terms of both relevant products
and scope," and the likely target would be the upstream part of the supply
chain, that is, from mine to smelter.'o
Canada has also been considering action on conflict minerals to ensure
that they are not used by Canadian companies in their supply chain."' A
comprehensive "private member's bill" was introduced in the Canadian
Parliament on March 26, 2013 that addresses corporate practices related to
conflict minerals from the Great Lakes Region, including their "extraction,
processing, purchase, trade, and use."' 1 2
Among other industry groups, the World Gold Council has undertaken
initiatives to combat potential misuse of gold to fuel armed conflicts.' 3 In
October 2012, it established the Conflict-Free Gold Standard, providing a
common approach for gold producers to assess the ways their gold has been
extracted, and a way to show that the gold they mine is conflict-free.1 4 The
process includes a human rights commitment, transparency about payments
to government officials, and steps to report any infringements of this
process to resolve grievances that local people might raise, with a yearly
external assessment." 5
108.

De Gucht, supra note 14, at 3.

109.

De Gucht, supra note 106, at 4.

110.
Harrison Mitchell, A Quick Update on a Possible EU Directive on Conflict Minerals,
RCSGLOBAL.COM (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.rcsglobal.com/blog/a-quick-update-on-a-possible-eudirective-on-conflict-minerals/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
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Aram Shishmanian, World Gold Council Conflict-Free Gold Standard: An Introduction,
wORLD GOLD COUNCIL (Mar. 2012), http://www.srz.com/files/upload/ConflictMinerals
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See Sue George, Conflict Minerals: What Can The Mining Industry Do?, THE GUARDIAN
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(last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
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Another similar initiative is the Responsible Jewelry Council's Code
of Practice (RJC), which encompasses both gold and diamonds, and is a
mandatory requirement for all RJC members." 6 Fiona Solomon, Director
of Standards Development of RJC, said that it "welcomes gold, diamonds
and platinum group metals companies from all parts of the supply chain,
geographies, and size of business to find out how they can play their part in
implementing responsible standards on the ground.""'
These initiatives are important because the researchers have a new
map showing mining sites in the eastern DRC controlled by armed groups
and the Congolese armies, which show that "the number one conflict
mineral from the region is now gold, which is harder to trace than the other
minerals from the area."' 8
With the May 3, 2014 deadline for companies to make their first
conflict minerals disclosures, the race is on to find effective software tools,
but the available supply chain management software is not considered
adequate to meet the disclosure requirements. Moreover, tracking the long
chain of middlemen, smelters, and refiners is not easily automated, and
most suppliers are unable to track the origins of their metals themselves.
The issue is that "if people know where they get their ore from, their
competitors will go to the source and cut them out of the supply chain."" 9
However, many consultants are currently providing the necessary advice to
companies to meet the requirements.120
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Id.

117.
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Nick Long, Map Shows Gold is Top Conflict Mineral in Eastern Congo, VOICE OF
118.
AMERICA (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1794975.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2014).
119.
Deadline Looms for Conflict Minerals Reporting, APICS.ORG (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.apics.org/apics-news/2013/11/19/deadline-looms-for-conflict-minerals-reporting
(last
visited Feb. 1, 2014).
See generally SOURCE INTELLIGENCE, CONFLICT MINERALS COMPLIANCE: DATA ASSESSMENT
120.
AND ASSURANCE (Nov. 2013), available at
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AssessmentAssurance WhitePaper Nov15.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); see generallyERNST & YOUNG,
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Publication/vwLUAssets/Conflict minerals/$FILE/ConflictMinerals US.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); see
generally GIBSON DUNN, CONFLICT MINERALS: UNDERSTANDING THE SEC's FINAL RULES (Sept. 14, 2012),

available
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http//gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/ConflictMinerals-UnderstandingFinal
SECRules.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); see generally Kristen Wallerstedt, 15 Tips for Complying with the
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V. APPRAISAL
It seems appropriate to begin this section by noting that the disclosure
requirements in Dodd-Frank, Section 1502 do not fit the SEC's mission, as
the purpose of the SEC's corporate disclosure is "to protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation."
The purpose and scope of the requirement were described in
the SEC's proposed rule in December 2010, which implemented DoddFrank Section, 1502: "It appears [to be] for the disclosure of certain
information to help end the emergency humanitarian situation in the eastern
DRC that is financed by the exploitation of trade of conflict minerals
originating in the DRC countries ....
However, it also acknowledged
that the requirement "is qualitatively different from the nature and purpose
of the disclosure of information that has been required under the periodic
reporting provisions of the Exchange Act." 23
Of course, there can be no challenge to the objective that Congress
intended to accomplish. The horrors the armed gangs have inflicted upon
the Congolese people are well known and have created a wide awareness
that action must be taken to curb violence. Thus, the question is not
whether action should be taken, but rather the form and nature of the action.
What is questionable, however, is the choice of the SEC as the institution to
require company disclosure to accomplish the task.
As the legislative history of Section 13 of the Exchange Act,124 which
was amended by Dodd-Frank, Section 1502, shows its disclosure
requirements were aimed at the "furnishing of complete information
relative to the financial condition of the issuer .

.

. which .

.

. [should] be

kept up to date by adequate periodic reports." 25 Thus, the purpose was that
reporting by a company would warn the potential investor about risks
associated with investing in the company. In contrast, Section 1502 is
aimed not at investor protection but prevention of exploitation and trade in

STATEMENT (Aug. 2013), available at http://www.graingercsr.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ConflictMinerals-Policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
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17 C.F.R. pts. 229 and 249).
123.

Id.

124.

15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934).

125.
Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC's New Role as Diplomaticand
HumanitarianWatchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1322 (2012) (quoting S. REP. No. 73-792, at 10
(1934)).

Nanda

2014]

303

conflict minerals responsible for financing armed conflict in the DRC and
contiguous countries in the region, thus curbing violence. Whether conflict
minerals are present in a company's product is not material to investor.
Daniel M. Gallagher, one of the dissenting Commissioners, stated at
an SEC Open Meeting when the rule was made implementing Section
1502:
Unfortunately, Section 1502 is about curtailing violence in the
DRC; it is not about investor protection, promoting fair and
efficient markets, or capital formation. Warlords and armed
criminals need to fund their nefarious operations. Their funding
is their lifeline; it's a chokepoint that should be cut off. That is a
perfectly reasonable foreign policy objective. But it's not an
objective that fits anywhere within the SEC's threefold statutory
mission . . . . I do not like to see social or foreign policy

provisions engrafted onto the securities laws. I have serious
doubt, in any event, about the efficacy of using the securities
laws to effect social and foreign policy aims, however noble and
urgent. I do think it is incumbent on the Commission to identify
and evaluate specifically the benefits of any rule we consider,
including those driven by a congressional mandate. In that
connection, I also believe that the limits of the SEC's statutory
mission are relevant. For these reasons, I cannot support the
rule.126
On October 4, 2013, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White said in a speech at
Fordham Law School in New York, "[s]eeking to improve safety in mines
for workers or to end horrible human rights atrocities in the [DRC] are
compelling objectives, which, as a citizen, I wholeheartedly share." 27 She
added, however, that "as the chair of the SEC, I must question as a policy
matter, using the federal securities laws and the SEC's powers of
mandatory disclosure to accomplish these goals."l 28
Questions have also been raised about the efficacy of Section 1502 in
accomplishing its purpose. To illustrate, at a House hearing on May 21,
2013, several participants expressed skepticism.
David Aronson, a
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freelance writer who has worked and lived in Central Africa for twenty-five
years, was one of the critics who stated that Dodd-Frank, Section 1502:
[I]mposed a de facto embargo on mineral production that
impoverished the region's million or so artisanal miners. It also
drove the trade into the hands of militia and predatory Congolese
army units.
The military situation on the ground has
considerably worsened since passage of the law, and the SEC's
promulgation of the implementation guidelines. 129
On April 14, 2014 the United States Court of Appeals District of
Columbia Circuit determined the outcome of the industry's challenge to the
validity of Dodd-Frank Section 1502 as it affirmed the District Court's
judgment in part and reversed in part.130 It affirmed the ruling regarding
claims under the APA and the Exchange Act,"' however, it reversed the
holding that the rule's disclosure requirement interferes with the right of
freedom of speech and hence violates "the First Amendment to the extent
the statute and rule require regulated entities to report to the Commission
and to state on their website
that any of their products have "not found to be
32
'DCR conflict free.""'l
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